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Abstract
The paper proposes a number of models to examine through what mech-
anisms a population of autonomous agents could arrive at a repertoire of
perceptually grounded categories that is suﬃciently shared to allow successful
communication. The models are inspired by the main approaches to human
categorisation being discussed in the literature: nativism, empiricism, and
culturalism. Colour is taken as a case study. Although the paper takes no
stance on which position is to be accepted as ﬁnal truth with respect to hu-
man categorisation and naming, it points to theoretical constraints that make
each position more or less likely and contains clear suggestions on what the
best engineering solution would be. Speciﬁcally, it argues that the collective
choice of a shared repertoire must integrate multiple constraints, including
constraints coming from communication.
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1 Introduction
This paper is about how a perceptually grounded categorical repertoire can become
suﬃciently shared among the members of a population to allow successful com-
munication. For example, how colour categories like ‘red’ or ‘purple’ may become
suﬃciently shared so that one agent from the population can use the word “red” to
get another agent to pick out a red object from a set of coloured objects in a scene.
Our own goal is entirely practical. We want to ﬁnd out how to design artiﬁ-
cial embodied agents (robots) such that they are able to do this task. Although
the artiﬁcial agents might end up with a quite diﬀerent categorial repertoire com-
pared to human beings, it is intriguing and challenging to investigate under what
circumstances they would arrive at human-like solutions, as this would enable com-
munication with humans. Because the agents will be considered to be autonomous
and distributed, we cannot assume telepathy nor central control. Because the real
world environments in which they will ﬁnd themselves will be assumed to be open-
ended and unknown at design-time (perhaps the agents are to be sent to a distant
planet), we cannot program into the agents a speciﬁc repertoire of categories be-
cause that would make them unable to adapt to new or unknown circumstances.
Moreover it is known to be very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to ground categories
in sensory-motor patterns by hand (Harnad, 1990), so some form of learning or
evolution will be unavoidable.
It seems a good idea to take as much inspiration as possible from categorisation
and naming by humans because that is the only and most impressive natural system
achieving shared perceptually grounded categorisation and communication based on
a rich open-ended repertoire of categories. Moreover if we can generate categorical
repertoires that are similar to those of humans it will make communication between
humans and artiﬁcial agents more feasible. The question how a population might
coordinate their perceptually grounded categories and negotiate a shared set of
linguistic conventions to express them is relevant to the computational modeling of
the origins of language and meaning, which is receiving increased attention lately
(Cangelosi and Parisi, 2001; Briscoe, 2002) and has important applications in man-
machine interaction.
With respect to human beings, it is generally acknowledged that human physical
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embodiment plays a signiﬁcant role. But it is also clear that this does not yet
constrain suﬃciently the set of possible categories an agent might utilise to cope
with the world. Three approaches have been suggested to aid the coordination of
categories over and above the constraints given by embodiment:
• Approach 1. Nativism. All humans could be born with the same perceptu-
ally grounded categories, as part of their ’mentalese’. So when children learn a
language, their categorical repertoire is already shared with that of caregivers
and they only have to learn the names of these categories. No inﬂuence of
language on category formation is deemed to be necessary. Assuming innate
perceptual categories implies that the neural mechanisms performing cate-
gorisation must be genetically determined and the relevant genes must have
evolved through evolution by natural selection. This position is historically as-
sociated with rationalism (Fodor, 1983) and often found explicitly or implicitly
in evolutionary psychology (Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Durham, 1991; Shepard,
1994). Adopting this position for the design of artiﬁcial agents means that we
must simulate genetic evolution (Holland, 1975; Goldberg, 1989; Koza, 1992;
Fogel, 1999). Agents could be given a genome that determines (through some
developmental process) how they categorise the world. We could then use
success in communication as the selection pressure acting in artiﬁcial evolu-
tion, and after some period of time, agents should have zoomed in on a shared
set of perceptually grounded categories adequate for communication. If the
environment changes or imposes new challenges, genetic evolution could still
help the population to adapt.
• Approach 2. Empiricism. All human beings share the same learning
mechanisms, so given suﬃciently similar environmental stimuli and a similar
sensory-motor apparatus they will arrive at the same perceptually grounded
categories reﬂecting the statistical structure of the real world. Hence the ac-
quisition of language is again a matter of learning labels for already known
shared categories and there is no inﬂuence of language on category formation.
This view is common among ’empiricist psychologists’ (Elman et al., 1996)
and researchers in inductive symbolic machine learning (Quinlan, 1993) or
connectionism (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). If we adopt this approach,
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the agents will need to have some inductive learning mechanism with which
they can derive the perceptually grounded categories relevant in their envi-
ronment, but it is not necessary to introduce a genetic basis for the categories
and hence the genetic structure of the agents can be much simpler. Each agent
now needs neural networks, or functionally equivalent clustering algorithms,
to perform statistical learning, as well as networks that learn the associa-
tion between names and categories. To guarantee continued adaptation to an
open environment, agents would need to regularly update their repertoire by
performing induction on new incoming stimuli.
• Approach 3. Culturalism. Although human sensory systems, learning
mechanisms, and environments are shared, there might still be suﬃciently
important degrees of freedom left so that categories are not yet suﬃciently
shared within a population to support communication. Culturalism there-
fore argues that language communication (or other forms of social interaction
where perceptual categories play a role) is required to further coordinate per-
ceptual categorisation by providing feedback on how others conceptualise the
world. So language now plays an additional causal role in conceptual devel-
opment (e.g. Gumperz and Levinson, 1996; Bowerman and Levinson, 2001;
Gentner and Goldin-Meadow, 2003).
This cultural hypothesis is favoured by those advocating a ‘cultural psychol-
ogy’ (Tomasello, 1999) and those viewing language and its underlying concep-
tual framework as a complex adaptive system that is constantly coordinated
by its users (Steels, 1997). If this approach is adopted for the artiﬁcial agents,
it requires that they are not only given mechanisms to invent or adopt cat-
egories and ways to create and adopt associations between names and cate-
gories, but also ways to align these choices with other agents based on feedback
in communication. The colour categories are now inﬂuenced by multiple fac-
tors: embodiment constraints, the history of interactions and the adaptation
after each interaction, and the collective consensus arrived at through negoti-
ation.
There seems no clear consensus in the cognitive science literature on which approach
is most appropriate. We ﬁnd researchers strongly arguing on the basis of children’s
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early word learning that language acquisition and concept acquisition go hand in
hand (Bowerman and Levinson, 2001), take a long time (Bornstein, 1985; Teller,
1998) and require a strong form of cultural learning (Tomasello, 1999), whereas
others have argued that perceptually grounded concepts are either innate (Shepard,
1994) or acquired prior and independently of language (Harnad, 1990) without direct
linguistic or categorical feedback (Bloom, 2000). So, the engineer is not given a clear
choice for what would be the best blueprint for implementing category formation
and naming by embodied communicating agents.
1.1 A Case Study for Colour
Colour has become a prototypical case study to investigate issues of category sharing
in humans because of the relative ease with which it is possible to gather data
(compared to for instance olfactory or gustatory experience) and because colour is
well understood as a physical phenomenon (Wyszecki and Stiles, 1982). Colour is
of course also one of the primary modes, although surely not the only one, in which
artiﬁcial robotic agents interact with the world, given the highly advanced state of
digital camera technology.
Knowledge about the neurophysiology, the psychophysics, and the molecular ge-
netics of colour vision has been increasing steadily (for an introduction see Gegen-
furtner and Sharpe, 1999). In recent years is has become clear that colour perception
is perhaps more variable within normal subjects than previously thought (e.g. Bim-
ler et al., 2004). Results from molecular genetics show that there are several allelic
variants of opsin genes, and that between 15 and 20% of Caucasian females has the
genetic potential to be tetrachromatic instead of trichromatic (Winderickx et al.,
1992; Neitz et al., 1993; Sharpe et al., 1999; Mollon et al., 2003).
The impact of the variation of the neural substrate on colour perception, colour
categorisation and colour naming is still being investigated. But it is another reason
from an engineering viewpoint why it is a good idea to take a closer look at how
humans arrive at shared categories. Fabrication processes of complex artifacts like
robots or cameras are such that there will always be individual diﬀerences, partic-
ularly if some form of calibration is involved. So if Nature has found a solution to
enable shared categorisation in communication, even if the perceptual apparatus is
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not exactly the same, then that is very relevant for communicating robots as well.
Psychologists and neurobiologists have been collecting large amounts of data
that could help understand how human beings arrive at shared perceptually grounded
categories for communication. Data supporting a genetic coding of colour categories
are sought by studying the colour categorisation behaviour of new-born children
(Bornstein et al., 1976; Gerhardstein et al., 1999). Data supporting the presence
of learning are sought in colour tests with pre-language children (Bornstein, 1975;
Bornstein et al., 1976; Davies and Franklin, 2002) and in experiments where indi-
viduals from one culture learn the colour categories of another one (Rosch-Heider
and Olivier, 1972; Roberson et al., 2000).
Anthropologists have also tried to collect empirical data for whether all human
beings in the world, whatever their language or culture, use exactly the same colour
categories (universalism) or whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences (relativism). If
colour categorisation is universal then this is of course a very strong indication that
either it must be genetically determined due to constraints on physiology (just as
each of us has ﬁve ﬁngers) or innate categorisation, or that there is enough statistical
structure in the real world so that neural systems performing clustering can easily
pick it out, as empiricists have been suggesting. In that case, it should be straight-
forward to use these universal categories as the basis of robotic implementations as
well.
The anthropological research has been conducted using colour naming tests and
memory tests (Berlin and Kay, 1969; Rosch-Heider and Olivier, 1972; MacLaury,
1997; Davidoﬀ et al., 1999; Kay et al., 2003), as ﬁrst introduced by Lenneberg and
Roberts (1956):
1. The naming experiments require informants to point to the best example for
one of the ‘basic’ colour words in their language. It has consistently been
found that subjects are not only capable of doing this, but that there is also a
large consensus in a language community about what the focal point is for a
particular word, even though there is less of a consensus about the boundaries
of its colour region (Berlin and Kay, 1969).
2. The memory experiments require informants to pick out a colour sample seen
earlier. It has been found that samples which are closer to focal points are
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better remembered than those closer to the boundaries (Rosch-Heider, 1971,
1972).
Berlin and Kay (1969) based on data of naming experiments and memory exper-
iments have argued strongly that the focal points of colour categories are shared by
all languages and cultures of the world. Recent analysis by Kay and Regier (2003)
of data gathered during the World Color Survey (Kay et al., 2003), conﬁrm that
there are cross-linguistic tendencies in colour naming in diﬀerent languages. Named
colour categories of languages across the world appear to cluster at points that tend
to be described by English colour names. But researchers like (Davidoﬀ et al., 1999;
Roberson et al., 2000; Davidoﬀ, 2001), have presented evidence through the same
sort of memory and naming tests that the focal points of English and Berinmo
(a Papua New Guinea tribe) are substantially diﬀerent and that Rosch-Heider’s
data has been misinterpreted. So despite the abundance of data, no consensus
has emerged in the universalism versus relativism debate, on the contrary, colour
categorisation seems one of the most controversial areas of cognitive science (e.g.
Saunders and van Brakel, 1997; Lucy, 1997; Sampson, 1997).
It is therefore not surprising that no consensus has been reached on how the per-
ceptually grounded categories underlying language communication become shared.
The nativist view on colour has been strongly defended, among others, by (Berlin
and Kay, 1969; Kay et al., 1991; Shepard, 1992; Pinker, 1994; Kay and Maﬃ, 1999)
based on the identiﬁcation of universal trends in colour categorisation. Language
plays no role in this. As Pinker puts it: “The way we see colors determines how
we learn words for them, not vice versa.” (Pinker, 1994, p. 63). Other researchers
have strongly defended an empiricist position, by trying to ﬁnd correlations between
speciﬁc environments and the colour categories of certain communities (Van Wijk,
1959), or by investigating how clustering algorithms can pick out the statistical dis-
tributions in natural colour samples (Yendrikhovskij, 2001). The culturalist view
on colour categorisation and colour naming has its own defendants, see e.g. (Lucy
and Shweder, 1979; Gellatly, 1995; Davies and Corbett, 1997; Davies, 1998; Dedrick,
1998; Jameson and Alvarado, 2003), among others.
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1.2 Objectives
The present paper does not take a stance on whether a nativist, empiricist or
culturalist approach is the most appropriate one for interpreting the human data.
It focuses on the pragmatic goal of ﬁnding the best way to design autonomous
embodied agents and leaves it up to future debate what this implies for human
categorisation and naming.
Our position is that multiple sources of constraints act on perceptually grounded
colour categories, and (at least in the case of artiﬁcial agents) all of them play a
role:
1. Constraints from embodiment: Although there are more variations in the hu-
man visual sensory apparatus than usually believed (see references given ear-
lier), there are of course still a large number of similarities in terms of what
part of the spectrum human retinal receptors are sensitive to, what percep-
tual colour appearance model is used, what low level signal processing takes
place (for example to calibrate perception to context), etc. Moreover there
are also constraints from the kinds of neural processes that are used for cat-
egorisation itself, and they show up in human categorisation behaviour, for
example through the importance of focal points. Nobody doubts that these
constraints help to shape the possible repertoire of perceptually grounded
colour categories and it has recently become possible to incorporate many of
these constraints in artiﬁcial vision systems. We will do so in all the experi-
ments reported in this paper.
2. Constraints coming from the world: Although there is signiﬁcant variation in
the environments in which human beings ﬁnd themselves (compare growing
up on the North Pole or in the rainforest), there are obviously considerable
similarities. Biological organismsmust be adapted to the environment to reach
viable performance and this is also true for categorisation. It implies that the
statistical structure of the environment has to be a second force shaping the
possible categorical repertoire. We can achieve this for artiﬁcial agents by
giving them stimuli that are taken from real world scenes. Of course, if they
have to be adapted to another environment (like Mars) they would have to
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be given stimuli from that environment.
3. Constraints coming from culture: We want to examine the hypothesis that
embodiment and statistical regularity of the environment is not enough to
achieve suﬃcient sharing for communication and that cultural constraints also
play a role. Cultural constraints are collective decisions made by a popula-
tion. For example, one community may decide to drive on the left side of the
road whereas another one may decide to drive on the right side. Speakers of
English have agreed to call a particular hue “blue” whereas they could just
as well have used a diﬀerent word like “plor”. Cultural choice is also avail-
able with respect to the perceptually grounded categories that are used in
conventionalised communication. Instead of making a categorical distinction
between blue and green, a population may decide to combine these into a
single category, as indeed many cultures have done. This implies that cul-
tural constraints should be a third force, shaping the perceptually grounded
categorical repertoire used for communication.
The ﬁrst source of constraints is preferred by nativists, and in some extreme
versions of nativism, it is argued that these constraints are enough to explain the
(universally) shared human colour categories underlying language. This can only
be when not only physiological constraints (such as those due to the retinal recep-
tors) are genetically determined but also the colour categories themselves, in other
words that the neural microcircuits performing colour categorisation are directly
laid down under genetic control. The second source of constraints is preferred by
empiricists. They accept of course that there are constraints from embodiment, but
these constraints still leave many degrees of freedom so that the categories still need
to be shaped for the most part by the environment. Moreover, they do not believe
that additional cultural constraints are necessary. The third source of constraints
is considered to be crucial by culturalists, even though they do not deny that em-
bodiment and structure in the environment may also play a role. Their position
has been the most controversial, perhaps because it is less obvious by what kind of
process cultural constraints could play a role. There is a chicken and egg problem:
to name a colour category it seems that this category must already exist and be
shared, so how can naming inﬂuence the shaping of the category?
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In order to tease apart the contributions from each source of constraints we
have constructed a series of theoretical models and compared their behaviour. Be-
sides the utility for designing artiﬁcial autonomous agents, we believe that this
eﬀort is also valuable for those exploring human (colour) categorisation and nam-
ing. Theoretical models make a particular view explicit and this makes it easier to
structure the debate for or against a certain position. Theoretical models bring out
the hidden assumptions of an approach, particularly with respect to the cognitive
mechanisms that are required and the information they need. Moreover they help
to assess the plausibility of certain assumptions, for example with respect to the
time that is required to acquire categories or propagate word-meaning pairs in a
population. Finally, theoretical models may suggest new experiments for empirical
data collection.
Theoretical investigations of the sort undertaken in this paper are very common
in many sciences but still surprisingly controversial for psychologists. For exam-
ple, there is now a large body of game theoretic models which have revolutionised
economics. These models are theoretical in the sense that they examine the conse-
quences of certain assumptions about the structure of interactions between agents
or the strategies they follow, for example they may show the presence or absence of
a Nash equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992). Usually it is not possible to collect the neces-
sary empirical data to make the model predictions empirically grounded, but still
a lot can be learned about the possibility of certain outcomes or their plausibility.
For example, they might help to infer the eﬀects of certain consumer behaviours
on speciﬁc business models, without evidence whether consumers actually exhibit
these behaviours. Similar theoretical approaches are now widespread in biology.
For example, it has been shown that certain observed phenomena, like cycles in
predator-prey populations, are due to the mathematical properties of the underly-
ing dynamical system and not to the speciﬁc biological instantiation (May, 1986).
The approach in this paper is in the same line and uses the same methodological
tools. The verbal interactions between the agents are modeled as multi-agent deci-
sion problems, called discrimination games (to categorise the world) and language
games (to communicate with others using these categories), and our main goal is
to understand what properties follow from the dynamical system implied by the
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structure of the interactions and the strategies of the agents.
1.3 Overview
Because nobody doubts that embodiment constrains perceptually grounded cate-
gories, we have ﬁrst of all attempted to integrate as well as possible the constraints
coming from the physics of light interacting with objects in the real world and the
constraints coming from the perceptual apparatus itself, as captured in widely ac-
cepted colour appearance models, such as the CIE L∗a∗b∗ space. We will also use
the same neural networks for categorisation (radial basis function networks) in each
of our models. These networks capture the prototypical nature of colour categori-
sation, as demonstrated by the naming and memory experiments, and are widely
believed to be realistic models of the behaviour of biological neural networks. All
our models incorporate these same embodiment constraints.
1. To explore position 1 (nativism) we introduce a model of genetic evolution
capable of evolving “genes” for focal colours and show how these genes can
become shared in a population. Notice that this represents the extreme na-
tivist position arguing that not only embodiment but also the perceptually
grounded categories themselves are innate.
2. To explore position 2 (empiricism) we introduce agents using an inductive
learning algorithm in the form of a neural network capable of acquiring colour
categories, and examine whether colour categories become shared among in-
dividual learners when the physiological and environmental constraints are
identical.
3. To explore position 3 (culturalism) we strongly couple category formation to
the situated use of colour categories in verbal communication and investigate
if this enables a population to reach a shared categorical repertoire.
We not only examine for each of these models whether a shared repertoire of
categories emerges but also whether a lexicon expressing these categories can arise
in the population, and whether categorical sharing is suﬃcient for successful com-
munication. This allows us to confront the ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem alluded to
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earlier: How can a self-organising lexicon inﬂuence an emergent adaptive categori-
cal repertoire and vice-versa?
The semiotic dynamics generated in the interaction between perception, cat-
egorisation, and naming is too complex (in a mathematical sense) to be solved
analytically, so we examine its properties through computer simulations, starting
from real world physical colour data captured by a multi-spectral camera. The use
of computer simulations for examining the behaviour of complex systems is common
in all the sciences of complexity, including non-linear physics (Nicolis and Prigogine,
1989) or artiﬁcial life (Langton, 1995). It is characteristic for the “methodology of
the artiﬁcial” (Steels, 2001b) and has been pioneered for colour cognition research
by Lammens (1994), who proposed the ﬁrst concrete computational models explor-
ing colour categorisation and naming. In order to make the simulations feasible,
cultural constraints will be exercised exclusively through language, even though
language is clearly not the only factor that embodies such constraints. Note that
the use of computer simulations does not imply any stance on whether the brain
is a computer (we believe it is not), just as the use of computer simulations to
make predictive models of the weather does not imply that the weather is seen as
a computer.
In the ﬁrst batch of experiments (section 3 and 4), the presented colour stim-
uli have no realistic statistical distribution, precisely because we want to examine
whether a population can coordinate its colour categorisation and colour naming
even if there is no chromatic distribution in the data. This therefore forces the
question whether coordination is possible, purely based on a structural coupling
between categorisation and naming processes. The main conclusion is that this is
indeed possible and hence that it is at least plausible that language plays a role
to coordinate the coordination of perceptually grounded categories. Our main con-
tribution here is to solve the chicken-and-egg problem by introducing a two-way
causality between naming and category formation.
Next, in section 5, we consider what happens when there is a statistical dis-
tribution in the samples. This will help us examine whether colour stimuli taken
from real world scenes are suﬃciently constraining so that no coupling between
categorisation and naming is required to explain how a population can coordinate
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its repertoire of perceptually grounded categories (either through genetic evolution
or statistical learning). The main conclusion here is that even if the statistical
structure of the world constrains the categories that arise in the agents, it is not
so obvious that the statistical structure of the environment alone can explain the
sharing of perceptually grounded categories. This conﬁrms that three interacting
forces are at work: embodiment, an environment with statistical structure, and
cultural negotiation.
Some conclusions and suggestions for further research end the paper.
2 Components for categorisation and naming
This section introduces the basic components needed for making computational
models of colour categorisation and colour naming: agents, environments, and tasks.
2.1 Agents
We deﬁne an abstract object called an agent. A set of agents is called a population.
We use small populations in this paper (typically 10 agents) because we know from
other work that the mechanisms being used in our models scale up to populations
of thousands of agents (Steels et al., 2002). All agents have the same architecture
for perception, categorisation, and naming but each has unique associated informa-
tion structures, representing its repertoire of categories and its lexicon. The agent’s
architecture is intended to model what we know today about human colour percep-
tion, categorisation and naming. Agents cannot use information structures of other
agents, so they have no telepathic access to the categories or lexicons used by other
agents. Neither do agents have a global view of what words are used by others.
They have only local information coming from the interactions in which they were
involved themselves. There is no central authority specifying how the agents should
conceptualise reality or speak. Agents only interact by exchanging words and by
non-verbal gestural feedback (pointing). The agent population is an example of
a distributed multi-agent system (Ferber, 1998), commonly used in artiﬁcial life
simulations.
Next we deﬁne verbal interactions between agents. An interaction has a commu-
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nicative goal, namely the speaker draws attention of the hearer to an object in the
environment. After each interaction, agents adapt their internal states to become
more successful in the future. So the framework of evolutionary game theory, which
has been used to model genetic and cultural evolution in biology (Maynard Smith,
1982), applies and we therefore call the interactions language games. The notion of
a language game resonates with the philosophical work of Wittgenstein (1953) who
emphasised the situated contextual nature of word meaning. Indeed, the agents in
our simulations are grounded, in the sense that their symbols are coupled to the
environment through a sensory apparatus (Harnad, 1990), embodied, because the
apparatus and subsequent processing reﬂects human physiology (Kaiser and Boyn-
ton, 1996), situated, because the games are embedded in the context of communica-
tive acts in a shared real world setting (Suchman, 1987), and cultural, because the
agents are part of a population with recurrent interactions between the members
(Sperber, 1996).
Genetic evolution is modelled by introducing change in the population. At
regular times, some of the agents are replaced by oﬀspring, i.e. mutated versions of
themselves, depending on their success in colour categorisation and colour naming.
This is in the spirit of research in genetic algorithms and evolutionary computing
(Holland, 1975; Goldberg, 1989; Koza, 1992; Fogel, 1999).
Individualistic learning is modelled by a process by which the categorical reper-
toires and lexicons of the agents change in interaction with the environment but
without interactions among the agents. This is in the spirit of connectionist learning
(Elman et al., 1996). Cultural learning is modelled by using a similar connectionist
learning algorithm but now with cultural constraints, exercised through language,
playing an additional role (Steels, 2001a).
2.2 The environment
The environment consists of 1269 matte ﬁnished Munsell colour chips (Munsell,
1976), familiar from anthropological experiments. We use the spectral energy dis-
tribution E(λ) reﬂected by physical chips as measured by a spectrometer from 380
to 800 nm in 1 nm steps (Parkkinen et al., 1989). So the simulations do not use
monochrome colour samples nor random values in RGB or another colour space,
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but start from realistic colour data. In each game, the agent(s) are presented with
a number of samples randomly drawn from the total set. This set constitutes the
context of the game. One of the samples is chosen as the topic. Choice of topic and
context reﬂect the ecological conditions of the environment.
The environmental complexity is experimentally controlled by changing the total
number of colour samples and the similarity between the samples. The ecological
complexity is controlled by varying the properties of the context: the average num-
ber of samples in a context and the (shortest) distance from the topic to the other
samples in the context. For example, ﬁne shades of orange may constitute the dif-
ference between edible and non-edible mushrooms. Mushroom eaters will therefore
need to acquire the ability to distinguish these ﬁne shades of orange. If the distinc-
tion is much clearer (for example because all edible mushrooms are orange and all
non-edible ones are white), the agents’ colour distinctions can be less ﬁne-grained,
even though the same diversity of orange shades might still occur in the environ-
ment. In general, when there are more samples and they are closer together, ﬁner
categorical distinctions are needed and the lexicon can be expected to contain more
colour words. This dependency between environmental and ecological complexity
on the one hand and cognitive complexity on the other is a property of the proposed
models but is not further discussed in this paper (see Belpaeme, 2001).
2.3 Agent architecture
2.3.1 Perception
All agents are assumed to have exactly the same perceptual process. Perception
starts from a spectral energy distribution S(λ) and is converted into tristimulus
values in CIE L∗a∗b∗, which is considered to be a reasonable model of human
lightness perception (L∗), and the opponent channels red-green (a∗) and yellow-blue
(b∗). This colour coding handles certain aspects of the colour constancy problem
as well (Fairchild, 1998, p. 219).
The spectral energy distributions are converted to XYZ coordinates using the
following equations.
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X = k
∫
S (λ) x¯ (λ) dλ
Y = k
∫
S (λ) y¯ (λ) dλ
Z = k
∫
S (λ) z¯ (λ) dλ (1)
x¯(λ), y¯(λ) and z¯(λ) are the 1931 2◦ CIE colour matching functions, describing
how an average observer reacts to chromatic stimuli1. The CIE L∗a∗b∗ colour
coding is computed directly from these CIE XYZ values using standard formulae
(Wyszecki and Stiles, 1982, p. 166).
Obviously the realism of this model can be improved. For example, Lammens
(1994) has started from the neural response functions proposed by (De Valois and
De Valois, 1975; De Valois et al., 1966) and showed how tristimulus values in another
colour space can be derived. This space, though carefully constructed and founded
on neurophysiological data, is not as suited for colour categorisation as is the CIE
L∗a∗b∗ space (Lammens, 1994, p. 142). So for categorising colour perception, CIE
L∗a∗b∗ remains a good choice2.
2.3.2 Categorisation
Categorisation is based on the generally accepted notion that colours have proto-
types and a region surrounding each prototype (Rosch, 1978) with fuzzy boundaries
(Kay and McDaniel, 1978). Categorisation can therefore be modelled with adaptive
networks, a modiﬁcation of radial basis function networks (Medgassy, 1961), which
are widely assumed to have a high biological plausibility (Hassoun, 1995). Input to
the network is a tristimulus x in CIE L∗a∗b∗ space.
An adaptive network consists of locally reactive units. These units have a peak
response at a central value m and an exponential decay around this central value.
The regional extent around m is determined by a normalised Gaussian function, of
which the width3 is deﬁned by parameter σ, thus giving rise to the magnet eﬀect
typically found in categorical perception (Harnad, 1990). The behaviour of each
unit j is deﬁned as follows:
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zj (x) = e
− 12
N∑
i=1
( xi−mji
σ
)2
(2)
Rather than using a single decision unit, as in the work of Lammens (1994), an
adaptive network is used for each colour category4. Each network contains weighted
locally reactive units, so that colour regions do not have to be symmetrical - as is the
case with only a single decision unit. Each unit in the network reacts to an incoming
stimulus x, as in eq. (2). The reaction of an adaptive network for category k with
J locally reactive units has the following form, familiar from perceptron-like feed
forward networks (Minsky and Papert, 1969), where wj is a weight factor with a
range between 0 and 1.
yk (x) =
J∑
j=1
wjzj (x) (3)
Each colour category has its own adaptive network and all networks consider the
input in parallel. The ‘best matching’ colour category b for a given tristimulus value
x is determined by a winner-take-all process based on the output of each categorical
network.
∀c ∈ C : yb(x) ≤ yc(x) (4)
The various components of the adaptive networks are summarised in ﬁgure 1.
Physiological evidence for locally reactive units in the domain of vision have been
found in the macaque monkey visual cortex (Komatsu et al., 1992) and these neurons
have been modeled by Lehky and Sejnowksi (1999).
2.3.3 Naming
Naming is modelled with an associative memory network L. One word form can
be associated with several categories (because the agent must be able to maintain
multiple hypotheses about what the meaning is of a word) and one category with
several word forms (because the agent must be able to maintain multiple hypotheses
about which word to use for a speciﬁc meaning). Given a set C of n categories and
a set F of m word forms, this network consists of n × m relations, each having
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Figure 1: Categorisation is performed by an adaptive network consisting of locally
reactive units fully connected to a summing output unit. Each such network corre-
sponds to one colour category.
a strength s ∈ [0.0, 1.0], so that L = C × F × [0.0, 1.0]. Words are randomly
selected from a ﬁnite alphabet of syllables. The strength of the association between
a category and a word can be varied, as explained later. When a word form f is
needed for a category c, there is a winner-take-all competition and the word form
with the highest strength wins. Conversely, to ﬁnd the category given a word form
f , there is again a competition. The category c with the highest strength is taken
as the winner.
2.4 Tasks
We will explore two types of interactions: The ﬁrst one requires an individual agent
to discriminate a sample (called the topic) from a set of other samples. This means
that the agent must not only categorise all the samples in the context but must also
ﬁnd a categorisation of the topic which is unique for the topic and does not apply
to any other sample in the context. We call this a discrimination game (Steels,
1996a). The second interaction is between two agents in a shared context playing
the role of speaker and hearer. The speaker chooses the topic, categorises it, using
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a discrimination game, and names the categorisation. The hearer must identify
the topic based on the category name. We call this a guessing game because the
hearer has to guess the object intended by the speaker through verbal means. We
have been using the guessing game in a wide variety of experiments investigating
the origins of language (Steels and Kaplan, 1999; Steels et al., 2002), including
experiments on autonomous mobile robots (Steels, 2001a; Steels and Kaplan, 2002;
Vogt, 2003).
2.4.1 The Discrimination Game
The discrimination game has been chosen so as to introduce the ecological dimension
in the models. As already mentioned, suppose that there are various types of
mushroom which all have similar form and shape but are only distinguishable based
on their colour, and only one type of mushroom is edible. Given a speciﬁc situation
with a number of mushrooms on the table, the agent must play a discrimination
game where the topic is the edible mushroom and the other objects in the context are
the non-edible ones. So ecology is concretised through what objects form a context,
and which ones are topics that need to be distinguished. Similar examples could
be given for distinguishing predators or prey based on colour marks, distinguishing
members of the group from outsiders using the colour of clothes, etc. In later
simulations, contexts are chosen randomly and any sample in the context can be
the topic, so there is no strong distinction between environmental constraints (what
stimuli are present in the environment) and ecology (which stimuli are functionally
signiﬁcant to the agent).
The discrimination game is deﬁned more precisely as follows. An agent has a,
possibly empty, set of categories C. A random context O = {o1, ..., oN} is created
and presented to the agent. It contains N colour stimuli oi of which one is the topic
ot. These colour stimuli take the form of spectral distributions of energy against
wavelength. The topic has to be discriminated from the rest of the context. The
game proceeds as follows.
1. Context O = {o1, ..., oN} and the topic ot ∈ O are presented to the agent.
2. The agent perceives each object oi and produces a sensory representation for
each object: Soi = {soi1 , ..., soiN}. The sensory representation is the CIE L∗a∗b∗
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value computed from the spectral distribution as discussed earlier.
3. For all N sensory representations, the ‘best’ category cSo ∈ C is found, ac-
cording to
cSo = argmax
C
(yc (So)) (5)
yc is the output of the adaptive network belonging to category c, and So is
the sensory input for an object o.
4. The topic ot can be discriminated from the context when there exists a cate-
gory whose network has the highest output for the topic but not for any other
sample in the context.
count
({
cSo1 , ..., cSoN
}
, cSot
)
= 1 (6)
2.4.2 The Guessing Game
The guessing game has been chosen because it is the most basic language game one
can imagine. It is a game of reference where the speaker wants to get something
from the listener and identiﬁes it through language, as opposed to gestures. Lan-
guage presupposes a categorisation of reality because words name categories and
not individual objects. The ecological relevance of guessing games is obvious. For
example, two people sit around the table on which there are various fruits of the
same form and shape but with diﬀerent colours. The speaker wants a particular
type of fruit (the topic). She says for example “could you give me the red one”,
whereby the hearer has to apply the category which is the meaning of “red” to the
objects in the context and identify the desired fruit. The meaning of “red” is the
category which discriminates the topic from the other objects in this context. So
the guessing game implies a discrimination game.
The guessing game is more precisely deﬁned as an interaction between two
agents, one acting as the speaker and the other as the hearer. The agents have
an associative memory relating colour categories with colour names. Each associa-
tion has an associated strength. The game consists of the following steps.
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1. A context O = {o1, . . . , oN} is presented to both the speaker and the hearer.
Only the speaker is aware of the topic ot ∈ O.
2. The speaker tries to discriminate the topic from the context by playing a dis-
crimination game. If a discriminating category cs is found the game continues,
otherwise the game fails.
3. The speaker looks up the word forms associated with cs. If no word forms are
found, the speaker creates a new random word form f by combining syllables
from a pre-given repertoire and stores an association between f and cs. On
the other hand, if there are word forms associated with cs, the one with the
highest strength s is selected. The speaker conveys word form f to the hearer.
4. The hearer looks up f in its lexicon. If f is unknown to the hearer, the
game fails and the speaker reveals the topic ot to the hearer by pointing to
it. The hearer then tries discriminating the topic ot from the context. If a
discriminating category is found, the word form f is associated with it; if no
discriminating category is found, a new category is created to represent the
topic and f is associated with it.
5. If the hearer does have the word form f in its lexicon, it looks up the associated
category ch and identiﬁes the topic by selecting the stimulus in the context
with the highest activation for this category ch. The hearer then points to
this sample.
6. The speaker observes to which sample the hearer is pointing and if this is the
one that it choose as topic, the game is successful. If not, the speaker identiﬁes
the topic and the hearer adapts its categorical network and its lexicon as in
(4) to become better in future games.
When agents only engage in discrimination games, the formation of colour cate-
gories is inﬂuenced by physiological, environmental and ecological constraints only.
When agents perform a discrimination game and a guessing game a cultural dimen-
sion is brought in (through language). Guessing games are therefore an eﬀective way
to study the potential causal relation between language and category acquisition.
Another reason for using the guessing game is that the colour chip naming exper-
iments widely utilised in anthropological research (Lenneberg and Roberts, 1956;
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Lantz and Steﬄre, 1964; Berlin and Kay, 1969; Rosch-Heider, 1972; Kay et al., 1991,
1997; MacLaury, 1997) are equivalent to guessing games. So, if needed, the results
of our simulations can be compared with anthropological data obtained with human
subjects. One diﬀerence is that the context in most anthropological studies usually
consists of all the Munsell chips and the topic is the best representative or proto-
type of a colour name. We believe that it would be desirable that anthropological
experiments are made more realistic by asking subjects to name topics within eco-
logically valid contexts (see also Jameson and Alvarado, 2003). Presenting all the
Munsell chips at once is obviously an unusual problem setting for human subjects,
no wonder that some report diﬃculties doing it.
We now discuss a series of computer simulations exploring diﬀerent ways in
which colour categories and colour names can be acquired. The ﬁrst series (section
3) assumes that there is no causal role of language in concept formation, so agents
only play discrimination games. The next section (section 4) uses guessing games
to explore the interaction between conceptualisation and language. As mentioned
earlier, no statistical structure is present in the data, in order to ﬁnd out whether
coordination of categories takes place even in the absence of such a structure. In
section 5, we then examine colour samples drawn from real world data where a clear
chromatic structure is present.
3 Learning without Language
We have seen earlier that there could be two approaches for the problem how con-
cepts are acquired: either they are learned or they are innately present, the latter
implying that they have evolved through genetic evolution. Both possibilities are
now explored in sections 3.2. and 3.3. respectively. The discrimination context is
the same for both experiments and consists of 4 stimuli chosen from a total of 1269
Munsell chips. In the learning case, the agents adapt their categorical networks dur-
ing their lifetime in the spirit of connectionist learning systems (Churchland and
Sejnowski, 1992). In the genetic evolution case, the agents have a ﬁxed network
and change only takes place when there is a new generation whose “colour genes”
have undergone some mutation, in the spirit of genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975).
But ﬁrst we need some measures to follow the progress and adequacy of concept
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formation (for more details on these measures see (Belpaeme, 2002)).
3.1 Measures
To play a discrimination game i the agent A is given a context that consists of a set
of (randomly chosen) colour samples. One sample from this context (also randomly
chosen) is the topic. The agent then exercises its categorisation network. There are
two possible outcomes:
1. The colour sample is uniquely categorised. Agent A is therefore capable of
discriminating the topic from the other colour samples. The discriminative
success for game i is dsAi = 1.
2. No unique category was found for the topic. The discrimination game has
failed. dsAi = 0.
The discriminative success of the agent for a speciﬁc environment ideally reaches
100 percent. In this case we say that the agent has acquired an adequate repertoire
of colour categories for that environment. The cumulative discriminative success at
game j for a series of n games is deﬁned as:
DSAj =
∑
dsAi
n
(7)
The average success of a population of m agents at game j is deﬁned as
DSj =
∑
DSAj
m
(8)
The category variance cv between the categorical repertoires of the diﬀerent
agents is measured by computing the cumulated distance between the categories of
the agents of a population A = {A1, . . . , An}, as in
cv(A) = 11
2n(n− 1)
n∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
D (Ai, Aj) (9)
D(Ai, Aj) is a distance measure between the category sets of two agents5.
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3.2 Individualistic Learning
We now present a model of individualistic learning. The update rule used by an
agent after playing a game is as follows:
When successful The weights wi of each locally reactive unit i of the discrimi-
nating category network are increased according to the following rule
wi = wi + β zi (Sot) (10)
Where zi (Sot) is the output of unit i for the topic Sot , and β is the learning
rate6.
When not successful The discrimination game scenario can fail in two ways.
First, the agent has no categories yet (C = ∅); in this case the agent creates
a new category centred on the topic. Second, no discriminating category can
be found because the category found for the topic is also applicable to the
other objects. When the discriminative success of the agent is lower than a
predeﬁned threshold (set at 95%), a new category is created. Otherwise, the
best matching category network is adapted by adding a new locally reactive
unit to its network.
Adding a new category is done by creating a category with only one locally
reactive unit centred on the sensory representation of the topic (m = Sot).
Adapting a category is similarly done by just adding a new locally reactive
unit sensitive to the topic.
After playing a discrimination game, the weights of all the locally reactive units
of all categories of the agent are decreased with a small factor. The weight decay,
a learning rule standard in the literature (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986; Krogh
and Hertz, 1995), is deﬁned as
wj = αwj (11)
where α ≤ 1 is a non-negative value. This takes care of a slow “forgetting”
of unused categories and thus of the reshaping of categories to remain adapted to
changes to the environment or the ecology.
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Figure 2: Average discriminative success DS and average number of categories
(dotted line) of 10 agents playing discrimination games.
The following graphs show the outcome of simulations exploring this model.
Agents play successive discrimination games with random sets of samples from
the environment and randomly chosen topics within each set. In a ﬁrst illustrative
experiment (ﬁgure 2) a population of 10 agents plays a series op 1000 discrimination
games. The context of a game contains four colour stimuli chosen randomly from
the complete set of over 1269 Munsell chips, of which one has to be discriminated
from the other three. The chips are at a minimum Euclidean distance of 50 from
each other in L∗a∗b∗-space. Agents take random turns playing a game. Two agents
are randomly selected from the population to play one discrimination game. The
x-axis maps to consecutive games. The left y-axis of ﬁgure 2 shows the average
success rate in the discrimination game with the learning rules used here. We
see clearly that discriminative success increases to almost 100 %, proving that the
agents are capable of developing a repertoire of colour categories adequate for the
given environment7. The right y-axis plots the size of the categorical repertoire. It
stabilises when the agents have become successful in discrimination. It is undeniable
that a repertoire forms which is adequate for the given environment and ecology.
When the environment or the ecology is more complex, agents take longer and the
25
number of categories increases, but the same trend is seen.
A mapping of the extent and focal points of the diﬀerent colour categories for
two agents onto the Munsell array is shown in ﬁgure 3.
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Figure 3: The maximum (white circle) and the extent (colour coding) of the cate-
gories of two agents after playing 1000 discrimination games. The chart consists of
saturated Munsell chips, following (Berlin and Kay, 1969). Observe how categories
are distributed across the Munsell chart, and how both agents end up with diﬀerent
categories.
Figure 4 shows that agents endowed with adaptive networks are capable of coping
with changes to the environment. The agents start now with a context of four stimuli
randomly chosen from a total of seven stimuli. The stimuli are equal to the Munsell
chips8 corresponding to red, yellow, green, blue, purple, black and white. The
categorical repertoires stabilise and after 50 games four more stimuli are added as
potential choices9. We see at ﬁrst a dip in discrimination success. Then the agents
quickly adapt to the more complex situation by expanding their colour repertoires.
Note that the population does not change during the course of the simulation and
agents do not interact with each other. The observed behaviour is entirely based
on individualistic learning.
Clearly the proposed mechanisms solve the acquisition problem, but what about
the sharing problem? Figure 5 compares the repertoire of the diﬀerent agents for
the same run as in ﬁgure 2, using the category variance metric cv deﬁned earlier.
Although the agents are all capable of discrimination, they use diﬀerent repertoires.
And although the repertoires tend to become more similar as the simulation pro-
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Figure 4: Average discriminative success DS and average number of categories
(dotted line) for a population of 10 agents which learn colour categories. In the
ﬁrst 50 games the context is chosen from a simple stimuli set, after 50 games the
set of stimuli is extended to increase complexity. The graph shows how the agents
cope to reach again a discriminative success of 100 %.
gresses, the similarity is not absolute (if all categories would be similar, the category
variance would be zero). This demonstrates that the constraints which are at work,
namely the physiological constraints (perception and cognitive architecture) and
the environmental and ecological constraints, are not enough to drive the agents to
the same solution space. Diﬀerent solutions are possible for the same task in the
same environment. More sophisticated physiological models will probably not alter
that fact. Indeed, it conﬁrms why it has not been proven possible to explain basic
colour categories based on physiological constraints alone (e.g. Gellatly, 1995; Jame-
son and D’Andrade, 1997; Saunders and van Brakel, 1997). If diﬀerent populations
exposed to diﬀerent environmental stimuli and ecological challenges are compared,
the repertoires of the agents in the population would be even more diﬀerent.
Table 1 shows the inter-population category variance cv′, a metric used to show
how well categories compare across populations. It is the average of the category
variance computed between all agents of two diﬀerent populations P and P ′. n and
m are the number of agents in the respectively population P and P ′, assumed to
be equal for all populations being compared.
cv′(P, P ′) =
1
nm
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
D
(
Ai, A
′
j
)
(12)
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Figure 5: The category variance of a population of 10 agents playing discrimination
games (for the same simulation as reported in ﬁgure 2). The graph shows how the
categories of all agents start to resemble each other due to ecological pressure, but
do not become equal.
Table 1 shows that the category sets of agents within and across populations are
quite dissimilar (an intuitive grasp can be obtained by comparing the values in this
table with other category variance tables in the following sections). If the categories
of agents are similar between two populations, cv′ would decrease. Populations
where all individuals have identical categories have cv′ = 0.
cv′ A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
A1 9.29
A2 10.14 9.38
A3 10.62 10.51 9.62
A4 10.84 11.25 10.94 9.22
A5 10.89 11.14 10.31 11.21 9.83
Table 1: Inter-population category variance cv′ of 5 populations of which the cate-
gories have been learned under identical experimental settings, except for the initial
random seed.
We conclude that
1. Individualistic learning leads to the development of an adequate repertoire of
colour categories.
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2. There is a certain percentage of sharing of colour categories within a popu-
lation, which can be attributed to shared physiological, environmental and
ecological constraints, but there is no 100 % coherence.
3. The colour categories are not shared across populations.
3.3 Genetic evolution
This section turns to the properties of genetic evolution. We examine a variation of
the previous model which includes diﬀerent generations of agents. Each agent has a
set of “colour genes” which directly encode its categorical networks, so we shortcut
the problem of modelling gene expression. The networks do not change during the
lifetime of the agent. Agents play exactly the same discrimination game as before.
They have a cumulative score, reﬂecting their success in the game, as deﬁned earlier.
This score will be used as the ﬁtness of the agent. The m ﬁttest agents (where m
is equal to 50% in the present simulation) are retained in the next generation and
the others are discarded. A single mutated copy is made of each remaining agent so
that the size of the population always remains constant. Mutations, which happen
with a probability inversely proportional to discriminatory success, can take four
forms with equal probability:
1. A new category network is added with a single locally reactive unit whose
centre is at a random point in the L∗a∗b∗ space.
2. A randomly chosen category network is expanded by adding a new locally
reactive unit whose centre m is at a random deviation from the centroid c of
the category. The centroid c of the category is computed as in (eq. 13). The
centre of the added locally reactive unit is randomly chosen from a normal
distribution with mean c and standard deviation σ.
c =
∑
wimc,i∑
wi
(13)
3. A randomly chosen existing category network is restricted by removing one,
randomly chosen locally reactive unit. If no unit is left the category network
itself is removed.
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4. An existing, randomly chosen category network is removed.
Only one mutation is allowed for each copy. Note that the mutation operator
does not use any intelligence about what might be good changes to the categorical
repertoire, as indeed it should be.
Figure 6 shows the behaviour of this model using the same environmental stimuli
as in the learning case discussed earlier (a context consists of 4 stimuli chosen from
a total of 1269 Munsell chips.) The x-axis plots the diﬀerent generations of agents.
The y-axis displays the success rate after n generations. This success rate is based
on the outcome of 50 discrimination games. We see that after several generations
a population of agents is reached which have adequate categorical repertoires for
the given environment. When this environment is made more complex (in a similar
way as in ﬁgure 4), genetic evolution generates more colour categories and after
a number of generations there is again an adequate repertoire (ﬁgure 7). Figure
8 shows the focus and extent of the categories of two agents plotted on the two
dimensional Munsell colour chart.
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Figure 6: Average discriminative success DS and average number of categories
(dotted line) for a population of 10 agents of which the colour categories are evolving
in a genetic fashion.
These results show that our model of genetic evolution is also capable of evolv-
ing agents that have adequate repertoires of colour categories. There is of course
a profound diﬀerence between the learning and genetic scenarios. In the learning
scenario, agents start their life with no colour categories, develop an adequate reper-
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Figure 7: Average discriminative success DS and average number of genetically
evolved categories (dotted line) for a population of 10 agents. In the ﬁrst 50 games
the context is chosen from a simple stimuli set, after 50 games the set of stimuli is
extended to increase complexity.
toire within their lifetime, and adapt to environmental changes (for example caused
by the availability of new dyes) also within their lifetime. In the genetic scenario,
successive generations of agents are needed before a generation arises that has an
adequate repertoire. So genetic evolution is much slower than learning, which is of
course a well known fact. This is borne out by the simulation results shown in ﬁgure
7 which uses the same data as the learning case in ﬁgure 4. Rather than adapting
after two dozen more games, the agents need about 20 generations (which would
amount to at least 400 years of evolution if such a mechanism was to be applied
to an equally small population of ten humans, counting a modest 20 years per gen-
eration). On the other hand, once genetic evolution has established a repertoire,
agents do not have to learn anything but get born with a ready-to-use categorical
repertoire.
Figure 9 displays the category variance between the categorical repertoires of
the agents in the case of genetic evolution. We see clearly that genetic evolution
not only solves the acquisition problem but also the sharing problem. The popu-
lation evolves towards the same categorical repertoire for all the agents. This is
in strong contrast with the learning scenario where the ﬁnal repertoires were never
identical. The cause of this sharing lies in the nature of genetic evolution. The
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Figure 8: The maximum (white circle) and the extent (colour coding) of the cate-
gories of two agents with genetically evolved categories. Because of the dynamics
of the evolutionary process, most categories of both agents are identical.
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Figure 9: The category variance of a population of 20 agents after evolving for over
50 generations (under the same conditions are ﬁgure 6). It can be seen that there
is hardly any variation between the categories of the agents.
colour genes coding the categorical networks of more successful agents propagate in
the population and so after some time these ’genes’ completely dominate. Which
colour categories come out depends on environmental, ecological and physiological
constraints, but there are multiple solutions. Genetic evolution randomly selects
one solution which then spreads to the rest of the population. This is clearly seen
by doing another simulation with exactly the same parameters (for the environ-
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ment, genetic mutation rates, etc.) but starting from another random seed. Due
to the randomness inherent in the genetic search process, both repertoires are very
diﬀerent. This is shown in table 2: The variation within a population is almost
nonexistent (≤ 0.40) but across populations the variation is considerable. With
diﬀerent ecological and environmental constraints the variation would be even more
dramatic.
cv′ A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
A1 0.40
A2 4.91 0.40
A3 3.98 5.75 0.05
A4 3.67 4.54 4.64 0.20
A5 5.60 6.26 6.10 5.55 0.27
Table 2: Inter-population category variance of 5 populations of which the categories
have been evolved using the discriminative success as ﬁtness measure.
We conclude that
1. Genetic evolution leads to the development of an adequate repertoire of colour
categories.
2. The colour categories are completely shared among the individuals within a
population.
3. The colour categories are not shared across populations.
4 Learning with language
The previous section compared individualistic learning with genetic evolution. Both
were capable to explain how categories may be acquired by individuals, but only
genetic evolution could also explain how colour concepts could become shared. In
the next series of experiments, we study the impact of language (and thus of culture)
on the formation of colour categories, by letting the agents play guessing games,
and discrimination games as part of a guessing game. Again we are interested to
model both cases: learning (section 4.2) and genetic evolution (section 4.3). First
we need some additional measures to follow the progress in the experiment.
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4.1 Measures
There are three possible outcomes of a guessing game:
1. The topic pointed at by the hearer is equal to the topic chosen by the speaker.
The game i is a success for both agents A: communicative success csAi = 1.
2. The topic pointed at by the hearer is not equal to the topic chosen by the
speaker. The game i is a failure for both agents A: csAi = 0.
3. The game got stuck somewhere halfway, either because the speaker or the
hearer did not have a discriminating category, or the speaker did not have a
word for the category or the hearer did not know the word. In this case the
game is also a failure for both agents A: csAi = 0.
The cumulative communicative success CSAj of an agent A at game j for the
last series of n games is deﬁned as
CSAj =
∑
csAi
n
(14)
.
The cumulative success CSj for a population of m agents A for the last series
of n games at game j is deﬁned as
CSj =
∑
CSAj
m
(15)
.
4.2 Lexicon acquisition
No one has ever proposed that humans acquire the vocabularies of their language
by genetic evolution, simply because lexical evolution is too rapid, most humans are
bilingual, and children clearly go through a long phase in which they acquire new
words (de Boysson-Bardies, 1999; Bloom, 2000). Nevertheless a number of mathe-
matical and computational models have appeared that show that genetic evolution
can in principle do the job (Nowak and Krakauer, 1999; Cangelosi, 2001). These
models code the lexicon as part of an agent’s genome, use communicative accuracy
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as selection pressure, and propose gene spreading as the mechanism by which the
group reaches coherence. Here we stick to the more realistic view that lexicons are
learned and that coherence arises through self-organisation in the population. Two
kinds of computational models have been proposed in such a case: observational
learning models that do not use negative evidence (Hurford, 1989; Oliphant, 1996)
and active learning models that use both positive and negative evidence (Steels,
1996b). It is the latter approach that is used further in this paper.
The word learning algorithm for the hearer and the speaker works as follows:
1. Assume that a speaker has associated the word forms {f1, ..., fm} with the
discriminating category ck and assume that fj is the word form with the highest
strength skj between fj and ck.
• If the communication was successful, the speaker increases the strength skj
by δinc = 0.1 and decreases the strength of connections with other categories
by δinh (this mechanism is called lateral inhibition).
• If the communication was unsuccessful, the speaker decreases the strength skj
by δdec.
2. Assume that the hearer has associated categories {c1, ..., cm} with the word
fk and assume that cj is the category that had the highest strength for fk.
• If the communication was successful, the hearer increases the strength sjk by
δinc and decreases the strength of competing words associated with the same
category by δinh.
• If the communication was unsuccessful, the hearer decreases the strength sjk
by δdec.
The algorithm has therefore three parameters. In later simulations we use δinc =
δinh = δdec = 0.1. Lateral inhibition is based on positive evidence (a successful
game) and is necessary to damp synonyms. When δdec > 0 negative evidence plays
a role, and this has been found to be necessary to damp homonymy.
When a speaker does not have a word yet for a category that needs to be
expressed, it creates a new word form (by generating a random combination of
syllables from a pre-speciﬁed repertoire) and adds an association between this word
35
and the category in its associative memory with initial strength s = 0.5. This
ensures that new words enter into the population and explains how a group of
agents may develop a grounded lexicon from scratch. When a hearer does not have
the word used by the speaker in its associative memory, it stores the new word with
a category that is capable of discriminating the topic pointed at by the speaker with
initial strength s = 0.5.
The positive feedback loop between use and success causes self-organisation, in
the sense of non-linear dynamical systems theory (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989),
(Stengers and Prigogine, 1986). An example of self-organisation is path formation
in an ant society. Ants deposit pheromone when returning to the nest with food.
This attracts other ants which also deposit pheromone, and so there is a a positive
feedback loop which causes all ants to assemble on the same path (Camazine et al.,
2001). In a similar way, the more speakers adopt a word and the meaning underlying
it, the more successful communication with that word will be and hence the more
speakers will adopt it. The positive feedback loop between the use of a word and
its success in shared communication, causes words to spread in the population like
viruses and eventually dominate. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 10, taken from a large-
scale experiment in lexicon formation discussed in (Steels and Kaplan, 1998). The
agents converge towards the same lexicon because once a word starts to become
successful in the population its success grows until it takes over in a winner-take-all
eﬀect due to the non-linear nature of the positive feedback loop.
Lexical incoherence may remain in the population if diﬀerent categories are
compatible with a large set of contexts (for example a particular word may for a long
time be associated with bright and yellow if in most situations the brightest object
is also the one that is uniquely yellow). This relates to Quine’s well known puzzle
(1960). A linguist observing a native can never be sure if gavagai means rabbit, or
hopping, or a temporal slice of a four dimensional space-time rabbit. Incoherence
will be disentangled when situations arise where the two meanings are incompatible,
for example a bright object which is blue. This type of disentanglement is also
observed with the mechanisms described here, see ﬁgure 11 taken from (Steels and
Kaplan, 1999), which discusses this “semiotic dynamics” in more detail.
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Figure 10: This graph plots the usage rate of all possible words for the same meaning
in a consecutive series of language games. Initially many words are competing until
one dominates due to a winner-take-all eﬀect.
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Figure 11: This graph plots (on the y-axis) the usage percentage of diﬀerent mean-
ings associated with the same word. Diﬀerent meanings may co-exist until a situa-
tion arises that disentangles them.
4.3 Cultural Learning
Given these processes we can now begin to study the interaction of word learning
and category acquisition. The ﬁrst experiment uses learning both for categories and
for words. When a category has been successful in the language game, i.e. it led to a
successful communication, it is re-enforced by increasing the weights of its network
according to eq. 10. This increases the probability that the category stays in the
repertoire of the agent and that it is the category of choice when a similar situation
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arises in the future. So there is a two-way structural coupling (Maturana and
Varela, 1998) between category formation and language: Language communication
stimulates the formation of categories because it calls for a discrimination game that
might lead to the learning of new categories. Category formation in turn stimulates
language because if the discrimination game generates a new category, this leads
to the creation of a new word. The discrimination game itself provides feedback
whether a particular category is successful and so it embodies environmental and
ecological constraints. The language game provides feedback whether the category
worked in the communication, and so it exercises a cultural constraint.
Figure 12 shows that these components lead to a satisfactory outcome. The
agents reach discriminative success and communicative success10. The graph plots
on the x-axis the number of games and on the y-axis average discriminative success
(top) and communicative success (bottom). The latter goes up to 90 percent. This
experiment shows therefore that cultural learning is capable of establishing a shared
repertoire of words in a population. It also shows that the categories underlying the
words are culturally coordinated, even though there is no telepathic access of an
agent to the categories used by another agent and even though the colour categories
are not innately given “at birth”.
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Figure 12: Average discriminative success DS (top) and average communicative
success CS (bottom) for a population of 10 agents of which the colour categories
are learned under inﬂuence of linguistic communication.
Figure 13 looks at the similarity between the categorical repertoires of the agents.
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We see that now the agents do have similar repertoires - in contrast with the ex-
periment in individualistic learning (section 3.2). This is due to the structural
coupling between the category formation process and language. Success (or fail-
ure) in language communication feeds back into whether new categories are created
or maintained in an agent’s repertoire. So this experiment shows that the Sapir-
Whorf thesis, advocating a causal inﬂuence of language on category acquisition
(Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956), is entirely feasible from a theoretical point of view.
Even more so, it shows that only due to such a causal inﬂuence will the agents de-
velop a suﬃciently shared categorical repertoire to allow successful communication.
This does NOT imply the colour categories are not inﬂuenced by embodiment and
statistical structure of the environment also. Hence these results do not imply that
colour categories are arbitrary. The point is simply that language communication
is a very eﬀective way for a population of agents to go the ﬁnal stretch in arriving
at a shared categorical repertoire.
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Figure 13: The category variance for the simulation described in ﬁgure 12. To show
the inﬂuence of language, the category variance for exactly the same circumstances
but now without language is plotted as well. The ratio between the two clearly
demonstrates how the similarity of the colour categories is drastically increased by
using language.
Note that ﬁrst learning colour categories and only then learning words as ad-
vocated by those arguing against such a causal inﬂuence would not work because
language learning is crucial for the convergence of colour categories. When agents
learn categories independently of language (as they do in the experiments discussed
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in section 3.2) their categories diverge too much to support communication later.
So both must be learned at the same time in a co-evolutionary dynamics. This
shows that the Sapir-Whorf thesis is not only feasible but the best way to reach
categorical coherence, and this based on coupling category formation to language.
Even with the same environmental, physiological and ecological constraints, two
populations without contact with each other would develop diﬀerent colour cate-
gories and consequently colour names with diﬀerent meanings. Multiple solutions
are possible but only one solution gets culturally frozen and enforced through lan-
guage in each population. This is further illustrated in table 3 which shows that the
inter-population coherence between agents in one population is high, but between
populations it is far lower.
cv′ A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
A1 0.30
A2 4.29 0.45
A3 3.83 4.52 0.36
A4 5.09 5.60 5.31 0.51
A5 5.26 5.80 5.37 6.08 0.55
Table 3: Inter-population category variance of 5 populations of which the categories
are learned under linguistic pressure.
To conclude this section, we examine what happens when populations with this
kind of semiotic dynamics change. This is done by introducing a ﬂux in the pop-
ulation. At regular time intervals an agent is removed from the population and
another agent is inserted. The new agent has no prior knowledge of the colour
categories nor of the words used in the population. Figure 14 shows that at renewal
rates that are not too high, communicative success is essentially maintained. New
agents obviously fail initially but pick up quickly the words and meanings that are
commonly used. This means that the lexicon and the colour repertoire gets trans-
mitted between generations purely through cultural learning. These results are in
line with other experiments with much larger agent populations and much larger
vocabularies (Steels et al., 2002). They are among the ﬁrst concrete computer sim-
ulations showing how the memetic evolution of language and meaning are possible
(Dawkins, 1976; Blackmore, 1999).
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Figure 14: Illustration of memetic evolution in a population of 5 agents. In each
game the context consists of 4 stimuli chosen from the complete Munsell set. A
ﬂux is introduction by replacing an agent after n games (where n=1000, 200 and
20 respectively). Too high a ﬂux destabilises the communicative success.
We conclude that
1. Cultural learning leads to the development of an adequate repertoire of colour
categories and an adequate repertoire of colour terms.
2. The colour categories are shared among the members of a population.
3. The colour categories are not shared across populations.
4.4 Genetic evolution
The next experiment tests the potential inﬂuence of language on the genetic evo-
lution of colour concepts. It uses the same genetic model as used in section 3.3,
and the learning algorithm for the acquisition of colour words explained in section
4.2. Rather than using discriminatory success to determine ﬁtness, communicative
success is used, so that the colour repertoire of the agents, genetically encoded in
their genes, is not only inﬂuenced by physiological, environmental and ecological
constraints but also by cultural constraints as embodied in language, despite the
fact that the lexicon itself is not genetically transmitted but learned by each gen-
eration. The agents that remain in the population keep their lexicons so that they
can be acquired by the new agents resulting from mutation.
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Figure 15 shows the outcome of the experiment. It displays communicative
success for successive generations of agents (bottom graph) and the discriminative
success (top graph). As discrimination is a prerequisite for further communication,
communicative success can only be reached when there is also discriminative success.
We see that the same sort of results are obtained as in the previous models. The
agents manage to evolve a shared repertoire of colour concepts - although now they
do it in a genetic way - and evolve a language for expressing these concepts - in a
cultural way.
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Figure 15: Average discriminative success DS (top graph) and average communica-
tive success CS (bottom graph) for a population of 20 agents of which the colour
categories are evolved. The ﬁtness of the agents is based on success in the guessing
game.
As in the previous genetic evolution experiment, the colour repertoires of diﬀer-
ent populations (and of course also the vocabularies that emerge) diverge, even if
the same physiological, environmental and ecological constraints are used. As ex-
plained earlier, the randomness inherent in genetic evolution causes the exploration
of diﬀerent parts of the search space. When cultural factors play a role in ﬁtness,
as is the case here, this divergence is even more pronounced.
We conclude that
1. Genetic evolution leads to the development of an adequate colour repertoire of
colour categories, even if the selectionist force includes learned cultural habits.
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2. The colour categories are completely shared among the members of the pop-
ulation.
3. The colour categories are not shared across populations.
5 The Role of Chromatic Distributions
We can already draw a number of conclusions from the experiments so far. The
ﬁrst two results constitute a necessary baseline that prove that our models satisfy
at least minimal working conditions:
1. The self-organisation of a shared lexicon in a population was shown to occur
through adaptive language games. The learning process must include a posi-
tive feedback loop between the choice of which words to use and their success
in use (section 4.3).
2. The formation of a repertoire of colour categories was shown to occur through
consecutive discrimination games, both for individual learning (section 3.2)
and for genetic evolution (section 3.3).
The next results are about the possible causal inﬂuence of language on category
acquisition:
1. Language may have a causal inﬂuence on category acquisition, both in the
case of cultural learning, if there is a structural coupling between success in
the language game and adoption of categories by the agents (section 4.3), and
in the case of genetic evolution (section 4.2), including if the ﬁtness function
integrates communicative success (section 4.4).
2. When there is this causal inﬂuence, the colour categories of agents within the
same population become coordinated in the case of cultural learning because
of the strong structural coupling between concept acquisition and lexicon for-
mation (section 4.3). Colour categories also become shared within the same
population in the genetic evolution model, because of the proliferation of ‘suc-
cessful’ colour categorisation genes (section 3.3).
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3. On the other hand sharing across populations did not occur neither for genetic
evolution nor for cultural learning. Genetic evolution necessarily incorporates
randomness in the search process which causes divergence as soon as two pop-
ulations develop independently, even when exactly the same constraints are
active. Diﬀerent ecological and cultural circumstances, which are inevitable
in split populations, will only increase this divergence (section 4.4). Learning
adapts even faster to ecological and cultural circumstances and so as soon as
these circumstances diverge, colour categories diverge as well (sections 3.2,
4.3).
So both a cultural learning hypothesis (with causal inﬂuence of language on
category acquisition) and a genetic evolution hypothesis (with integration of com-
municative success into ﬁtness) could explain how agents in a population can reach
a shared repertoire of categories and a shared lexicon for communicating about the
world using these categories. The diﬀerence between the two models appears to be
in terms of the time needed to adapt to the environment or reach coherence. Ge-
netic evolution is orders of magnitude slower than cultural learning and so it could
only work when almost no change takes place in the environment nor the ecology
of the agents. The larger the population and the more it is spread out, the longer it
takes for genes to become universally shared. Moreover genetic evolution requires
that a lot more information is stored in the genome, and that the developmental
process will be more complex, as it requires ﬁne-grained genetic control of neural
micro-circuits (including genetic coding of the weights in networks). We leave it up
to geneticists and neurobiologists to judge the plausibility of such an assumption in
the case of humans (Worden, 1995). But there can be no doubt that for designing
autonomous robots the cultural learning solution is preferable.
However we have not examined yet what happens when the sensory data pre-
sented to the agents has a statistical structure. That might also lead to the creation
of a repertoire of shared categories - even in the absence of language interaction.
So we will now introduce samples taken from real world scenes as stimuli. This
will allow a fair examination of the empiricist argument that colour categories are
coordinated precisely because the real world environment has enough statistical
structure so that any kind of clustering algorithm (and ipso facto a neural network
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that embodies a statistical clustering algorithm) would allow the population to ar-
rive at shared categories. It would also give support to the nativist position because
environmental constancy and regularity is required for genetic evolution to zoom in
on these statistical regularities (e.g. Shepard, 1992).
5.1 Categories from Real World Samples
Chromatic data of natural surfaces and the frequency with which these stimuli oc-
cur in natural scenes are available (see e.g. Hendley and Hecht 1949; Burton and
Moorhead 1987; Howard and Burnidge 1994), but it is obviously diﬃcult to get
data reﬂecting the ecological importance of colour stimuli for a particular culture
and thus the data can never show what aspects of real world scenes people actually
pay attention to. Nevertheless, Yendrikhovskij (2001) has investigated how colour
categories can be extracted from the statistics of natural images. He uses a clus-
tering algorithm to extract colour categories from a sample of natural colours, and
concludes not only that categories can be reliably extracted, but also that the ex-
tracted colour categories resemble the basic colours identiﬁed by universalists, and
that this is due to the chromatic distribution of the perceived environment. Also,
increasing the k parameter (where k is the number of desired clusters) leads to a
growing set of categories which more or less corresponds to the evolutionary order
as proposed by Berlin and Kay (o.c.). This is a very important and relevant result
for the present discussion and so we decided to replicate it.
The neural networks used in previous sections for modeling categorisation are
sensitive to the statistical distribution of colours in the environment. Indeed, Radial
Basis Function networks (on which the categorical networks are based) stem from
linear models research in statistics and have been generally used to induce a function
from sample input-output pairs (Medgassy, 1961). It therefore makes sense to use
real world colour samples as source of data in discrimination games and see what
categories come out. We have collected two batches of data: one from natural
environments and another one from urban environments. The natural data set
contains 25,000 pixels drawn randomly from photographs of animals, plants and
landscapes, while the urban data contains 25,000 pixels drawn from photographs
of buildings, streets, traﬃc, shops and other urban scenes. Both data sets have a
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speciﬁc distribution, with an abundance of lowly saturated colours and much fewer
highly saturated colours (as already observed by Hendley and Hecht, 1949). To allow
comparison, a third data set containing 25,000 uniformly random sampled Munsell
chips is also used. All constraints on embodiment used in earlier experiments,
including the use of the CIE L∗a∗b∗ colour appearance model have been maintained.
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Figure 16: Results of discrimination game experiments for natural (left) and urban
data (right). The centroids of all colour categories of 10 agents are plotted. Agents
arrive at focal points which are more constrained than for random data but not
suﬃciently to explain sharing.
Results of discrimination games with these data are shown in ﬁgure 16. The
left side shows the focal points of 10 agents for natural environments, and the right
side the same for urban environments. Agents were left to play discrimination
games until they each reached on average eleven categories11. Results from another
experiment where agents were given samples from a randomly distributed data set
are shown in ﬁgure 17. For reference, the location of human basic colour categories
are shown as well in all diagrams (Sturges and Whitﬁeld, 1995).
We see that the statistical structure in the data clearly helps the agents to reach
a higher degree of categorical sharing than would otherwise be the case. There
is for example a clustering around the origin a∗ = b∗ = 0 for both natural and
urban environments, whereas we do not see these clusters in randomly distributed
samples. This comparison is made more precise in ﬁgure 18. Notice however that
there is still signiﬁcant categorical variance between the agents exposed to the same
type of environment.
These results clearly show that even if there is a statistical structure, there
is increased sharing but the sharing is surely not complete, neither among the
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Figure 17: Results of experiments in statistical learning of colour categories for
random data. Note how categories are spread out over the colour space.
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Figure 18: Category variance for three runs of 10 agents playing discrimination
games. The agents have in each run been oﬀered diﬀerent kinds of colour stimuli:
Munsell stimuli, having a uniform statistical distribution, and natural and urban
colour stimuli, having a non-uniform distribution. The statistical structure of the
natural and urban stimuli aids the agents in achieving more coherent categories.
members of the population nor among diﬀerent populations. There are several
reasons why this is the case. Although the natural and urban data now have natural
chromatic distributions, there is random sampling going on within these data sets so
agents within the population do not get exactly the same data series. The opposite
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would be a very unrealistic assumption anyway, both for human beings and for
autonomous agents. Second, the inﬂuence of the two environments (urban versus
natural) works also against sharing, simply because the statistical structure of the
two environments is diﬀerent. Anthropological observations show however that
individuals growing up in diﬀerent environments but speaking the same language
have the same colour categories, and vice versa, individuals growing up in similar
environments but speaking diﬀerent languages often have diverging colour categories
– cfr. Papua New Guinean cultures (Kay et al., 2003).
It could be argued that the sensitivity observed here is due to the speciﬁc clus-
tering method used, namely discrimination games and adaptive RBF networks. But
this is not the case. We applied the clustering algorithm used by Yendrikhovskij
(2001) and used his method of sampling, and similar results were obtained. Fig-
ure 19 shows the category variance12 for categories extracted from random, natural
and urban stimuli. Categories extracted from natural and urban stimuli have ap-
proximatly half the variance of categories extracted from stimuli with a uniform
distribution. From this we can conclude that learning without the inﬂuence of lan-
guage in a structured environment indeed increases the sharing of categories across
agents, but the sharing is never absolute.
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Figure 19: Category variance for categories extracted from three diﬀerent types
of chromatic stimuli: random, natural and urban stimuli. The agents now used a
clustering algorithm instead of discrimination games and each agent extracted 11
categories.
Yendrikhovskij (2001) used the CIE L∗u∗v∗ colour appearance model instead
of the CIE L∗a∗b∗ model used in this paper, and so we compared the outcome for
both colour appearance models (ﬁgure 20) and even between these we see signiﬁcant
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variation. The fact that clustering is sensitive to the colour appearance model shows
that –even small– variations in colour perception, as surely occurring in humans
(Gegenfurtner and Sharpe, 1999; Neitz et al., 2002), drives a purely empiricist
acquisition of colour categories to diverging results.
-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
clustered in CIE L*a*b*
clustered in CIE L*u*v*
extent of all natural stimuli
basic categories (Sturges and Whitfield, 1995)
a*
b*
yellow
blue
black
white
red
green
Figure 20: Clusters extracted from natural chromatic data. Five clusters are ex-
tracted in the CIE L∗a∗b∗ space (diamonds) and ﬁve are extracted in the CIE
L∗u∗v∗, but then mapped onto and displayed in the L∗a∗b∗ space (squares). The
clusters diﬀer to a large extent, demonstrating how the colour space inﬂuences the
clustering.
Perhaps even more importantly, the categories that agents end up with (still us-
ing Yendrikhovskij’s clustering algorithm and the same data sets) vary signiﬁcantly
both with respect to natural versus urban environments and with respect to the
basic human colour categories proposed in the literature (Sturges and Whitﬁeld,
1995). This is shown in table 4 below. It shows the correlation13 between (a) cate-
gories extracted by the clustering algorithm14 and (b) human colour categories (as
measured by Sturges and Whitﬁeld, 1995). Perhaps surprisingly, statistical extrac-
tion of categories from natural colour data with a clear statistical structure does
not deliver categories that resemble human colour categories more than do cate-
gories extracted from random data. Even more, the correlation between categories
extracted from natural, urban or random colour data is approximately equal. This
demonstrates that the non-uniform chromatic distributions –i.e. the urban and nat-
ural data– do not lead to categories that are similar. They correlate as much with
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each other as with categories extracted from random data.
human natural urban random
human 1 0.615 0.580 0.562
natural 1 .593 0.622
urban 1 0.462
random 1
Table 4: Correlation between human colour categories and 11 clusters extracted
from the natural data set, the urban data set, and a random data set.
Clearly the chromatic distribution of colours in the environment can inﬂuence
which colour categories are adopted by a population and how similar they are, but
it is far from obvious that it alone can explain the sharing of perceptually grounded
categories in a population and even less so the universal sharing of colour categories
across populations. What all this means for human colour categorisation remains a
matter of debate. We do not claim that inductive learning on real world environ-
ments could not potentially yield the basic human colour categories, perhaps with
much more constraints on embodiment, with much greater exposure to a variety of
environments, etc., but it does not seem so straightforward as often assumed.
We do claim however that the experiments allow a clear conclusion for the design
of artiﬁcial agents: It would be risky to rely only on embodiment constraints and
statistical clustering for forming the repertoire of perceptually grounded categories
for use in communication. Inevitable variation in hardware, camera calibration,
sampled data, colour appearance model, and arbitrary choices during clustering,
would lead to important categorical variation between the agents or between agents
exposed to diﬀerent environments. It is also unlikely that (artiﬁcial) genetic evo-
lution without integrating communication in the ﬁtness function would work to
suﬃciently coordinate perceptually grounded categories. Given that we have a very
straightforward and eﬀective mechanism to coordinate categories through language
(as shown in section 4), it would be irrational not to use it.
6 Conclusions
This paper examined the question how a perceptually grounded categorical reper-
toire can become suﬃciently shared among the members of a population to allow
successful communication, using colour categorisation as a case study. The paper
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did not introduce new empirical data but examined through formal models the con-
sequences of adopting certain approaches which were all inspired from the study
of human categorisation and naming. We explored in particular three positions:
(1) All human beings are born with the same perceptually grounded categories
(Nativism). So when children learn a language, their categorical repertoire is al-
ready shared with that of caregivers and they only have to learn the names of these
categories. (2) All human beings share the same learning mechanisms, so given
suﬃciently similar environmental stimuli they will arrive at the same perceptually
grounded categories which reﬂects the statistical structure of the real world (Em-
piricism). Hence the acquisition of language is again a matter of learning labels
for already known shared categories and there is no strong inﬂuence of language
on category formation. (3) Although learning mechanisms and environments are
shared, there are still important degrees of freedom left. Language communication
(or other forms of social interaction where perceptual categories play a role) helps
to coordinate perceptual categorisation by providing feedback on how others con-
ceptualise the world (Culturalism). So language now plays an important causal role
in conceptual development.
As stated several times, our motivation for these investigations is to ﬁnd the
best way for designing agents that are able to develop a repertoire of perceptually
grounded categories that is suﬃciently shared to allow communication. But we
believe that these results are relevant to a much broader audience of cognitive
scientists who have been puzzling over the same question.
The ﬁrst contribution of the paper is to introduce concrete models so that a
comparison of the diﬀerent positions is possible. The models have been deﬁned
in enough detail and precision to allow computer simulation. Most of the time
debates on categorisation and naming have assumed particular mechanisms (for
example for acquiring categories or for associating names with categories) without
specifying exactly how these mechanisms were supposed to work. This has made it
diﬃcult to formulate clear arguments for or against certain positions.
The second contribution of the paper is to establish some important properties
for each model: First, we have shown that the coupling of category formation with
language leads to the coordination of perceptually grounded categories (both in
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the case of genetic evolution and in cultural evolution with learning of language),
even if there is no statistical structure in the data. Second, we have conﬁrmed
that although clustering algorithms (and neural networks that embody them) are
sensitive to the statistical structure of real world data, it is not so obvious that this
alone can explain how perceptually grounded categories can become shared.
The models presented here could be made more complex and more realistic, in-
tegrating more constraints based on what is known about human physiology, neuro-
logical processing, brain development, genetics, language, real world environments,
ecology, etc. but this complexity would be more of a hinder than a help because it
would obscure the contribution of the dynamics. On the other hand, integrating all
these additional constraints will be necessary to explain the kinds of cross-cultural
trends that have been observed in colour naming (Kay et al., 1991; Kay and Regier,
2003) or why certain cultures have adopted particular categorical repertoires and
not others.
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Notes
1k is a normalising constant, the colour spaces use relative colorimetry with
k = 0.00946300, which is based on the standard CIE illuminant called “D65”: if
the D65 illuminant is used as stimulus, the Y -value will be exactly 100.0. For other
stimuli, this results in XYZ values between 0 and approximately 100.
2An alternative to the CIE L∗a∗b∗ space is the CIE L∗u∗v∗ space (Wyszecki
and Stiles, 1982; Fairchild, 1998), which is also intended to be an equidistant colour
model, meaning that colours can be compared using a simple distance function
(something which is not possible in other colour spaces such as CIE XYZ or RGB,
the last one being a the technical colour representation used in colour display devices
such as television and computer monitors).
3The results are not very sensitive to diﬀerent values of σ within a certain range.
In the simulations reported here, σ is ﬁxed to 10. The adaptive networks do not
share locally reactive units, however this does not mean that they cannot have units
sensitive to the same region in the colour space.
4Alternatives could be considered for the representation of the colour categories.
One possibility would be to implement categories as single points in colour space. In
addition with a distance metric, this representation would exhibit most properties
associated with perceptual categories. However, categories would have a spherical
membership function in the colour space, this is an assumption we would not like to
make. Another alternative, which avoids this, uses k-nearest neighbour classiﬁcation
(Mitchell, 1997). Here a category is made up of several examples of colour stimuli,
and classiﬁcation of a stimulus happens through measuring the distance between
the stimulus and the exemplars belonging to each category.
5For the category variance measure (eq. 9 and 12) a distance metric D between
two category sets is needed. For this we ﬁrst deﬁne a distance metric d between
two point sets A = {a1, . . .} and B = {b1, . . .},
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d (A,B) =
∑
a∈A
min
b∈B
‖a− b‖+ ∑
b∈B
min
a∈A
‖a− b‖
|A| . |B| (16)
This distance metric d has the following properties. (1) The distance between
two identical sets is zero, d(A,A) = 0. (2) The distance is symmetrical, d(A,B) =
d(B,A). (3) The distance is non-negative, d(A,B) ≥ 0. (4) The sets need not have
the same number of elements.
Recall that a category consists of locally reactive units with a central value m
and a weight w. The distance between two categories c and c′ can be computed as
the weighted distance between the central values of the locally reactive units. We
deﬁne the distance between two categories as
dcategory(c, c′) = d({m1, . . . ,mn} , {m′1, . . . ,m′m}) (17)
with ‖m−m′‖ = w.w′.
√∑
(m−m′)2
where n and m are the number of locally reactive units in respectively category
c and c′.
An agent has a set of categories, the distance D between two category sets of
agent A and agent A′ is deﬁned as
D (A,A′) =
∑
c∈A
min
c′∈A′
dcategory(c, c′) +
∑
c′∈A′
min
c∈A
dcategory(c, c′)
|A| . |A′| (18)
where |A| and |A′| are the number of categories of agent A and A′ respectively.
Note that the distance measure is sensitive to the number of categories: more
categories result in a lower D (A,A′) value. The category variance is therefore
necessarily a relative measure —to be interpreted by comparing it to other category
variances— rather than an absolute measure.
6The learning rate β is a positive value and is by default β = 1. It determines
how fast weights of the locally reactive units increase in reaction to the successful
use of the category. β is not critical to the results attained, but should be set such
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that it balances the decay rate α of weights in eq. 11. α takes care of a slow
forgetting of categories, and is set by default to α = 0.1.
7The baseline discriminative success –i.e. the chance success that agents would
achieve by randomly creating categories– depends is proportional with the number
of categories of an agent and inversely proportional with the size of the context.
The baseline discriminative success can be estimated numerically; in this particular
example it is 0.26 at game 1000.
8The Munsell codes of the stimuli are 5 R 5/14, 5 Y 8.5/10, 5 G 7/10, 5 B 5/8,
5 P 5/8, 5 R 9/15, R 5/2.
9The four added stimuli are 5 YR 7/10, 5 GY 8/10, 5 BG 7/8 and 5 PB 5/10.
10The baseline average communicative success is always lower than the average
discriminative success. When agents do discriminate the stimuli in the context per-
fectly and when they are able to interpret the communicated words, the baseline
communicative success will never be lower than 1/size of context, i.e. the hearer’s
success of randomly guessing the topic. Communicative success in most circum-
stances never reaches 100%: some topics are located just between two categories,
and subsequently two agents might classify the topic with categories having diﬀer-
ent colour terms, which makes the guessing game fail. Just like argueing over the
colour of ones shirt, the agents do not always agree on what category a stimulus
belongs to.
11Berlin and Kay (1969) say that there are eleven basic colour categories, but
other than that there is not speciﬁc reason why we let the agents play discrimination
games until they have on average 11 categories.
12The category variance for categories extracted with a clustering algorithm is
computed in the same way as the category variance for adaptive networks; see eq.
9, in which D is now deﬁned as eq. 16. Note that the category variance reported in
ﬁgure 19 can not be compared to category variance values elsewhere, as the distance
measure is diﬀerent in this case.
13The correlation measure used is the Kendall’s Tau-b correlation. We chose this
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measure as it is a non-parametric test and does require the data to have a normal
distribution. The test returns values between -1 and 1. A value of 1 indicating
that the correlation is perfect, and a value of -1 that the correlation perfect but
inverse. Values in-between -1 and 1 indicate a correlation to a lesser degree, with 0
signifying that is no correlation between the data.
14The cluster algorithm used here is the k-nearest neighbour algorithm (Mitchell,
1997), as also used by Yendrikhovskij:2001. It extract k clusters from a set of values
using an iterative optimisation method. First, k = 11 clusters were extracted from
each data set (the nature data set, the urban data set and a data set containing
random colours). Then, the extracted centroids of these clusters were taken to com-
pute the correlation with human colour categories. For this, the centroids needed
to be matched with the human colour categories: this was done by an exhaustive
search to ﬁnd the optimal match. Next, correlations were computed in the L∗, a∗,
b∗, C∗ab and Hab dimensions (with C
∗
ab and Hab being the chroma and hue of the
CIE L∗a∗b∗ space, see Wyszecki and Stiles, 1982). Each correlation reported in
table 4 is the mean of these ﬁve correlations.
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